Fiber Optics: Infrastructures of Light

Cellular Tower. Photo Credit: Alan Levine Licensed under CC-0

At first glance, it would seem that society is dominated by wireless systems that transmit data in a manner invisible to the human eye. What is even less visible is the hundreds of thousands of miles of fiber optics that carry information at the speed of light, and the data centers that store and near instantaneously dole out this information at a user’s behest. The speed at which this information transfers has become almost second nature, and when a connection is slow to respond it can create less than optimal experiences, what NYU Media, Culture, and Communication professor Nicole Starosielski refers to as the ‘aesthetics of lag’1 a term that updates Lucas Hildebrand’s notion of the ‘aesthetics of access’ which refers to the degrading of videotapes over repeated viewing. While digital information does not degrade in the same way as videotapes, the medium is susceptible to simultaneous repeated viewing, through restrictions in bandwidth, and the limitations of the data centers that serve up the information.

Fiber optics connecting a network switch.

While fiber optics are far faster at carrying information that any wireless standard, the connections break far more often than we realize. According to a 2008 WIRED Magazine article, undersea fiber cables break every three days, and terrestrial cables break far more often than that.2 Thanks to the mandated use of decentralized networking, no on break in a line causes a complete break in the connection of the internet. The use of distributed networking is a holdover from the internet’s days of infancy, where it started first as a project of ARPA (Advanced Research Projects Agency) and then later under DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) as the agency moved under the umbrella of the U.S. Department of Defense during the Cold War. The thought being that distributed networking would make the United States national information network impervious to nuclear attack.3,4

If you imagine every line in this photo a network connection, it might help to understand the power in structure a distributed network has. Break a few connections and it makes no difference to the overall structure. Photo credit Berkshire Community College, licensed under CC-0
Network distribution in an office.

It is not just breaks that must be dealt with on a regular basis. Switching equipment is necessary to keep the fiber links up and running, and along with these switches comes a need for electricity, cooling, and security to keep the connections safe at every connection point. One such point is a network hotel, which WIRED toured in a 2015 article. The ‘hotel’ in downtown Manhattan was merely an outward façade of the building’s previous use. Inside were thousands of miles of cable, where fiber long haul cables come in from around the country and interfaces with local internet service providers.5 It is important to note that no fiber optic cable is without these types of facilities on either side of a cable.

 It is easy to turn a blind eye to the infrastructures necessary to keep our wireless world functioning. However if we peel back the black boxing of ‘technology’ and look at the technical systems that allow our current forms of communication to exist, we find that there are material infrastructures behind every bit of invisible ‘magic’.  

Sources

1 Starosielski, Nicole 2015. Fixed Flow: Undersea Cables as Media Infrastructure. In Signal Traffic: Critical Studies of Media Infrastructures. Urbana; Chicago; and Springfield: University of Illinois Press, p. 53.

2 WIRED Staff (2008). Cable Cut Fever Grips the Web. [online] WIRED. Available at: https://www.wired.com/2008/02/who-cut-the-cab/ [Accessed 19 Nov. 2019].

3 Green, L., 2010. The internet : an introduction to new media., Oxford: Berg.

4 Galloway, A.R. & American Council of Learned Societies, 2004. Protocol : how control exists after decentralization., Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

5 WIRED Staff (2015). The Internet Lives in a Huge Hotel in Manhattan. [online] WIRED. Available at: https://www.wired.com/2015/11/peter-garritano-where-the-internet-lives/ [Accessed 19 Nov. 2019].

The plant that kills. Glyphosate as a security infrastructure

Dónde se concentran los cultivos de coca en Colombia
Source: Revista Semana (2019) “El 62 por ciento de la coca está sembrada en el 5 por ciento del país”. Available in the link: https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/donde-se-concentran-los-cultivos-de-coca-en-colombia/626644

How does glyphosate is used as a security infrastructure in Colombia?

“Introduced as the active ingredient in Roundup in the 1970s, glyphosate is a non-selective herbicide, which means that it can eliminate almost any type of plant to which it is applied – even desirable plants.” (Bayer Global)[1]. With US interventions and alliances, Colombia has used glyphosate as one of the main tools to address the “war against drugs”[2]. Plan Colombia, an agreement between the US and Colombia’s government, financed the use of glyphosate to attack two of the main “hazards” for citizenship: the internal armed conflict and drug trafficking. Using fumigation airplanes, the State bathes the soil with glyphosate, and kills any trace of non-human life over coca leaves crops.

The Constitutional Court[3] sentenced that the aerial spraying of glyphosate could not be used again until there was a 100% proof that this herbicide makes no harm to humans’ health, but the current government is trying to implement it again.

Aviones fumigando
Source: BBC News (2015) ” OMS defiende clasificación del glifosato como posible cancerígeno”. Available in the link: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/ultimas_noticias/2015/03/150327_ultnot_glifosato_cancerigeno_monsanto_oms_polemica_aw

If we consider the definition of structural violence given by Rodgers and O’Neill (2012), we could think about glyphosate as the material – and ignored – side of structural violence against “cocaleros”. Most of these farmers are disjointed from the national economy, are victims from the armed conflicted, and/or find no other alternative to have a decent income (Cruz, 2019)[4]. The State, in these remote areas of Colombia’s territory, makes presence in the toxic materiality of glyphosate.

Collier and Lakoff (2008) talk about how the US government characterized terrorism as a non-deterrable threat, which meant that it was impossible to point at a specific actor that could be treated as a hazard or an enemy. Given the enormous network involved in drug trafficking, that goes from cultivating coca leaves crops, to corrupted relationships with the military and the government, and ending in the consumption of cocaine even beyond Colombia’s frontiers, it is also a context in which it is almost impossible to blame a specific enemy. Therefore, the coca leaves crops become the most tangible target.

In this sense, the State treats coca leaves crops as being the exact same thing as cocaine, ignoring all the different dynamics, contexts and actors involved in each stage of transformation of the coca leaves. There was a national campaign in 2008 that said: “do not cultivate the plant that kills”. Even though it was withdrawn in 2010[5], the campaign shows the modus operandi of the government: criminalizing cocaleros as a way of finding someone to blame in an enormous and complex conflict. Then, coca leave crops are objectivized as the threat (Amoore, 2006), they become a category that must be eradicated.

Source: La Silla Vacía (2009) “Logo campaña la mata que mata”. Available in the link: https://www.flickr.com/photos/lasillavacia/3995960508

To finish, I would like to ask, how, in terms of Foucault analysis, could we problematize our notion of security? Is persecuting production of coca leaves crops an actual solution? Shouldn’t legalization of crops could be consider as a more accurate strategy?


References:

Amoore, L. (2006). “Biometric borders: Governing Mobilities in the war on terror”. Political Geography25 (3), 336-351.

Collier S. & A. Lakoff (2008). The Vulnerability of Vital Systems: How ‘Critical Infrastructure’ became a security problem. In The Politics of Securing the Homeland: Critical Infrastructure, Risk and Securitisation  London: Routledge.
http://anthropos-lab.net/wp/publications/2008/01/collier-and-lakoff.pdf

Rodgers, D & B. O’Neill (2012). “Infrastructural violence: Introduction to the special issue”, Ethnography 13(4):401-412.

[1] Bayer (n.d.) “Glyphosate-based herbicides and modern faming practices”. Available in the link: https://www.bayer.com/en/about-glyphosate-based-herbicides-and-their-role-in-agriculture.aspx

[2] Cosoy, Natalia (2016) “Has Plan Colombia really worked? BBC News, Colombia. Available in the link: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-35491504

[3] Kongevinas, Manolis (2019) “Probable carcinogenicity of glyphosate”. The BMJ. Available in the link: https://www.bmj.com/content/365/bmj.l1613

[4] Cruz, Felipe (2019) “Las marchas cocaleras, una expresión del derecho a pedir derechos”. DeJusticia. Available in the link: https://www.dejusticia.org/column/las-marchas-cocaleras-una-expresion-del-derecho-a-pedir-derechos/

[5] Revista Semana (2010) “Corte ordena retirar campaña publicitaria ‘la mata que mata'”. Available in the link: https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/corte-ordena-retirar-campana-publicitaria-la-mata-mata/126042-3